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Abstract
This paper explores semi-monotonicity constraints in the distribution of potential out-
comes, first, conditional on an instrument, and second, in terms of the response function.
The imposed assumptions are strictly weaker than traditional instrumental variables as-
sumptions and can be gainfully employed to bound the counterfactual distributions, even
though point identification is only achieved in special cases. The bounds have a simple
analytical form and thus have much practical relevance in all instances when strong exo-
geneity assumptions cannot be credibly invoked. The bounding strategy is illustrated in a
simulated data example and applied to the effect of education on smoking.
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1 Introduction
A major concern about traditional instrumental variables (IV) methods is the validity of the
imposed exogeneity assumption. For example, in the standard linear model, a valid instrument
is assumed to be correlated with the endogenous regressor and uncorrelated with the outcome
error. In the treatment literature, the distribution of potential outcomes is assumed to be
independent of the instrument, perhaps conditional on covariates. Full independence is some-
times replaced by the weaker equality of mean outcomes, but in any case, the credibility of
the imposed exogeneity assumption is inevitably subject to dispute since it cannot be formally
tested using the empirical evidence alone.
The aim of this paper is to explore the identifying power of modest functional form assump-
tions. The restrictions are imposed on the potential outcome distribution, first, conditional on
an order restriction in one covariate (which will be denoted the instrument), and second, in
terms of the response function. For example, the equality of these distributions over different
values of the instrument, as imposed by common IV models, is replaced by a sequence of weak
inequalities, allowing for global extremum points. In accordance with the previous literature
(e.g., Manski and Pepper 2000, 2009), the conditions will be referred to as monotonicity and/or
semi-monotonicity assumptions, depending on the shape of the distribution. The identification
strategy partially addresses Manski and Pepper’s (2000) call for extension of their monotone
instrumental variables approach to stochastic dominance.
Three main implications can be drawn from the analysis. First, although point identifica-
tion of the counterfactual distributions is generally not feasible, the derived bounds are sharp
given the assumptions. Thus, without imposing additional stucture on the data-generating
process, no improvements over the stated bounds can be obtained. Second, if the instru-
ment is the treatment indicator itself, then the bounds have a very simple analytical form,
it is straightforward to calculate their sample values, and to conduct inference using known
methods. Third, the paper avoids any distributional, independence, or exclusion restrictions.
Hence, the derived bounds have important practical relevance in all cases when such assump-
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tions cannot be credibly invoked.
While the assumptions are all motivated in the context of ordinal outcomes as observed,
for example, in the evaluation of future economic developments (e.g., Broz and Plouffe 2010),
records about educational attainment (e.g., Ermisch and Francesconi 2001), or measures of
individual health (e.g., Wildman and Jones 2008), the proposed methods are equally applicable
to continuous and mixed discrete/continuous outcomes. The distinction is inconsequential for
the partial identification results and the derivation of bounds, but it has implications for the
estimation and inference methods. The former is subject of this paper, issues regarding the
latter will only be briefly discussed at the end.
The partial identification of counterfactual quantities under weak monotonicity constraints
has been initiated in the literature by Manski (1995, 1997) and Manski and Pepper (2000).
Subsequent research further developed and applied the idea of monotone instrumental variables
(MIV), and monotone treatment response (MTR), in the context of wage regressions (Blundell
et al. 2007, Gonza´les 2005), health care utilization (Gerfin and Schellhorn 2006, Kreider
and Hill 2009), reporting errors (Kreider and Pepper 2007, 2008), and the intergenerational
transmission of schooling (de Haan 2008). Okumura and Usui (2007) combine the concave-
MTR assumption of Manski (1997) with the monotone treatment selection (MTS) assumption
of Manski and Pepper (2000) to obtain sharp bounds on the average treatment effect that are
tighter than those obtained by imposing either set of assumptions alone.
In the context of discrete outcome data, Bhattacharya et al. (2008) use the Shaikh and
Vytlacil (2005) strategy to bound the effect of Swan-Ganz catheterization on patient mortality,
without imposing a priori knowledge of the sign in the MTR assumption. Boes (2009, 2010)
derives sharp bounds on ordered outcome distributions by imposing a nonparametric threshold
crossing model, and by taking advantage of a sequential information structure. Machado
et al. (2009) consider the implications of weak monotonicity assumptions on the outcome
and selection process in the binary/binary case, partly drawing on the results of the above
literature, on Balke and Pearl (1997), and on Heckman and Vytlacil (2001). See also Chiburis
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(2009) for a generalized linear model approach, and Chesher (2007, 2008) for a non-linear
structural model approach.
A related strand of the literature concerns the empirical analysis of moment inequalities,
as derived for example in Pakes et al. (2006) and Pakes (2009). Chernozhukov et al. (2007)
and Andrews et al. (2004) establish general identification, estimation, and inference results for
such models. See also Rosen (2008), Guggenberger et al. (2008), Andrews and Guggenberger
(2009), Andrews and Han (2009), Romano and Shaikh (2009), and Stoye (2009). Most of this
literature can be embedded within the broader topic of partially identified models (Manski
2003, Tamer 2009). Regarding discrete outcomes, Manski and Tamer (2002) discuss inference
on regressions with interval data. Tamer (2003) analyzes the incompleteness of a simultaneous
binary choice model. Inference is discussed, for example, in Imbens and Manski (2004).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next two sections propose several
variations of the MIV and MTR assumptions. Section 4 investigates the identifying power
when both sets of assumptions are imposed jointly. Section 5 illustrates the construction of
bounds in a simulated data example and applies the proposed methods to bound the effect of
education on smoking. Section 6 concludes.
2 Semi-Monotonicity in Subpopulations
2.1 Instrumental Variables Assumptions
Suppose that outcomes are (at least) measured on a discrete ordinal scale, i.e., responses can
be ranked from low to high, but differences between outcomes are not necessarily defined.
Each individual is assumed to have a response function, denoted by Y (s) ∈ Y, that determines
the outcome in each state s ∈ S. Let S ∈ S denote the realized state, let Y = Y (S) denote the
realized outcome, and let X = (W,V ) denote the vector of covariates with support X =W×V.
The observed data are the triple (Y, S,X) with distribution P (Y, S,X).
The problem is to learn P [Y (s) ≤ y] or P [Y (s) ≤ y|W ] for all s ∈ S from the observed data
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distribution. Without imposing additional assumptions, point identification from P (Y, S,X)
fails because the outcome of each individual is only observed in the realized state, the outcomes
that would have occured under alternative states are logically unobserved. This yields the no-
assumptions bounds of Manski (1990):
P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s) · P (S = s|W ) ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W ] ≤ (1)
P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s) · P (S = s|W ) + P (S 6= s|W )
which follows by the law of total probability, and bounds zero and one on the counterfactual
distributions P (Y ≤ y|W,S 6= s). The interval defined in (1) can also be interpreted as an
identification region for the potential outcome distribution (Manski 2003).
Additional information can be gained using an instrumental variables strategy. Standard
IV methods state that covariate V is an instrument if the distribution of outcomes for each
s ∈ S conditional on W does not change with different values of V . Formally,
Assumption (IV). Covariate V is an IV in the sense of conditional independence in the
distribution of Y if, for each y ∈ Y, s ∈ S, W ∈ W, and all u1, u2 ∈ V × V,
P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u1] = P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u2]. (2)
Assumption IV implies that P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V ] = P [Y (s) ≤ y|W ] and thus a lower bound
on the latter is given by the largest of the lower bounds on P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u] over all u,
and an upper bound is given by the smallest of the upper bounds on P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u]
over all u (Manski 1990, 1995).
Now assume that V is an ordered set. A distributional equivalent to the MIV assumption
of Manski and Pepper (2000) would be that the distribution of Y (s) for all individuals with a
specified W and value u1 of V weakly dominates the distribution of Y (s) for individuals with
the same W but with u2 ≥ u1. Formally,
Assumption (MIV). Let V be an ordered set. Covariate V is an IV in the sense of weak
stochastic dominance in the distribution of Y if, for each y ∈ Y, s ∈ S, W ∈ W, and all
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u1, u2 ∈ V × V with u1 ≤ u2,
P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u1] ≥ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u2]. (3)
Depending on the application and the implications of the theoretical model, the sign of the
inequality may be reversed such that the distribution of Y (s) conditional on V = u2 weakly
dominates the distribution of Y (s) conditional on V = u1.
Assumption MIV implies for any u ∈ V with u1 ≤ u ≤ u2 and ∀y ∈ Y that
P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u1] ≥ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u] ≥ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u2]. (4)
Thus, a lower bound of P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u2] is also a lower bound of P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u],
and an upper bound of P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u1] is also an upper bound of P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V =
u]. This must hold for all values u1 ≤ u and must hold for all values u2 ≥ u. Exploiting the
full support of V , the following sharp bounds on the distribution of potential outcomes can be
derived (see Manski and Pepper 2000, but also Blundell et al. 2007):
inf
u1≤u
{
P [Y ≤ y|W,S = s, V = u1] · P (S = s|W,V = u1) + P (S 6= s|W,V = u1)
}
≥ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u] ≥ (5)
sup
u2≥u
{
P [Y ≤ y|W,S = s, V = u2] · P (S = s|W,V = u2)
}
.
Bounds on P [Y (s) ≤ y|W ] can be obtained by integrating out over the support of V (subject to
measurability conditions). Two remarks can be made regarding the properties of the bounds
in (5). First, they are not informative if the lower and upper no-assumptions bounds on
P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u] weakly decrease with u, in which case they coincide with the no-
assumptions bounds. Second, the bounds coincide with the IV bounds if the no-assumptions
lower and upper bounds on P [Y (s) = y|W,V = u] weakly increase with u.
Assumption MIV might be too restrictive if monotonicity only holds for subsets of V. For
example, one might think of a combination of monotonically increasing and monotonically
decreasing distribution functions P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u] over the support of V . Formally,
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Assumption (MMIV). Let V be an ordered set. Covariate V is an IV in the sense of partial
weak stochastic dominance in the distribution of Y with a global maximum if, for each y ∈ Y,
s ∈ S, W ∈ W, and all u1, u2 ∈ V × V with u1 ≤ u2 ≤ umax = argmax
u∈V
P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u],
P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u1] ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u2], (6)
and for all u1, u2 ∈ V × V with umax ≤ u1 ≤ u2,
P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u1] ≥ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u2]. (7)
Assumption MMIV (the maximum monotone instrumental variables assumption) yields
the assumption MIV as a special case if the global maximum point is at the lower boundary
of V. While assumption MMIV allows for a single break in the monotonicity of P [Y (s) ≤
y|W,V = u] over the support of V , multiple break points would be possible as well. However,
the identification of a global optimum is generally easier to establish from economic theory than
multiple local optima. Depending on the application, assumption MMIV might be reversed to
a minimum condition (justifying the more general semi-monotonicity terminology).
In order to analyze the implications of assumption MMIV on the (partial) identification of
P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u], define the following subsets of V:
V lmax = {u ∈ V : u ≤ argmax
u∈V
P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u]}
Vumax = {u ∈ V : u ≥ argmax
u∈V
P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u]}.
For any u ∈ Vumax with u1 ≤ u ≤ u2 and evaluation points u1, u2 ∈ V
u
max × V
u
max, and ∀y ∈ Y,
assumption MMIV implies the same set of inequalities as in (4), and thus the same bounds
on P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u]. For any u ∈ V lmax with u1 ≤ u ≤ u2 and u1, u2 ∈ V
l
max × V
l
max, and
∀y ∈ Y, assumption MMIV implies
P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u1] ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u] ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u2]. (8)
Thus, an upper bound of P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u2] is also an upper bound of P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V =
u], and a lower bound of P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u1] is also a lower bound of P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u].
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This must hold for all values u1 ≤ u and for all values u2 ≥ u as defined above. Exploiting
the full support of V yields the following sharp bounds:
Proposition 1. Let assumption MMIV hold. Then for any u ∈ V lmax,
sup
u1≤u∈V lmax
{
P [Y ≤ y|W,S = s, V = u1] · P (S = s|W,V = u1)
}
≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u] ≤ (9)
inf
u2≥u∈V lmax
{
P [Y ≤ y|W,S = s, V = u2] · P (S = s|W,V = u2) + P (S 6= s|W,V = u2)
}
.
and for any u ∈ Vumax,
sup
u2≥u∈Vumax
{
P [Y ≤ y|W,S = s, V = u2] · P (S = s|W,V = u2)
}
≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u] ≤ (10)
inf
u1≤u∈Vumax
{
P [Y ≤ y|W,S = s, V = u1] · P (S = s|W,V = u1) + P (S 6= s|W,V = u1)
}
.
In the absence of other information, these bounds are sharp.
Compared to assumption MIV, the construction of bounds under MMIV requires a split
of the support of V into two parts, one for the lower level set and one for the upper level
set relative to the global maximum point (including the maximum as a boundary). These
two sets yield the bounds in (9) and (10), respectively. Note that weak monotonicity in the
no-assumptions lower and upper bounds on P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u] implies that either (9) or
(10) coincides with the no-assumptions bounds or the bounds under IV, and vice versa. Note
too that Proposition 1 requires credible knowledge about umax.
In order to motivate the foregoing assumptions, consider the following example. Suppose
one is interested in the effect of education (S) on individual health (Y ). Assume that educa-
tion outcomes are generated according to an ordered choice model with the optimal stopping
time determined by pairwise comparisons of returns in adjacent schooling stages. A common
assumption in this model is the concavity of the marginal return function; see Cunha et al.
(2008) for a discussion of this type of model and extensions. Let the threshold values depend
on transition-specific characteristics (such as school subsidies or tuition fees), some of which
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are unobserved, and assume, for simplicity, that there are three levels of subsidies: no subsidy
(V = u1), modest subsidy (V = u2), and maximum subsidy (V = u3).
For V to serve as an instrument in the sense of IV we would assume that the potential
health distribution does not change with the level of the subsidy. This assumption might
be reasonable if subsidies are assumed to be independent of health behavior. If, however,
the smarter people are more likely to get a grant, and they are also better able to take
care of themselves, then assumption IV would be invalid (support for the existence of such a
channel is provided, for example, by Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2009). However, assumption
MIV would be reasonable if transition-specific subsidies increase the education outcomes and
are symmetrically related to health behavior (generating a weak stochastic dominance with
increasing V ; the lower V , the lower the potential health).
If there is an asymmetry in the link to individual health, then monotonicity might be
combined with a weak concavity assumption. For instance, if education outcomes are generally
higher the higher the subsidies, and if the transition to the higher education levels are more
relevant for generating positive health (Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2009, for related arguments),
then the dominance of the distribution of potential health conditional on V = u1 relative to
V = u2 might be smaller than that of V = u2 relative to V = u3. In the extreme case, this
might yield a maximum point at V = u2, and thus conform with MMIV. The data examples
below will further illustrate this point.
2.2 Semi-Monotone Treatment Selection
A special case of assumptions IV, MIV, and MMIV is obtained if V is the treatment variable
itself. In this case, the IV assumption is equivalent to the exogenous treatment selection
assumption, stating that the potential outcome distribution does not vary with S, i.e., for
each y ∈ Y, s ∈ S, W ∈ W, and u1, u2 ∈ S × S,
P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,S = u1] = P (Y (s) ≤ y|W,S = u2]. (11)
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This assumption point identifies the counterfactual distribution since P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,S 6= s] =
P [Y ≤ y|W,S = s], and thus P [Y (s) ≤ y|W ] = P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s).
The MIV assumption becomes a monotone treatment selection (MTS) condition assert-
ing that the potential outcome distribution given S = u1 weakly dominates the distribution
conditional on S = u2 with u1 ≤ u2. The MTS assumption implies that
u < s ⇒ P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s) ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,S = u] ≤ 1
u = s ⇒ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,S = u] = P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s) (12)
u > s ⇒ 0 ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,S = u] ≤ P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s),
and thus
P [Y ≤ y|W,S = s] · P (S ≤ s|W ) ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W ] ≤ (13)
P [Y ≤ y|W,S = s] · P (S ≥ s|W ) + P (S < s|W ).
The MMIV assumption with V = S postulates the existence of a unique global maximum point
umax = argmaxu∈S P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,S = u]. The potential outcome dstribution is assumed to
be monotonically increasing for all states u ≤ umax and monotonically decreasing for all states
u ≥ umax. Corollary 1 summarizes the bounds implied by this maximum monotone treatment
selection (MMTS) assumption.
Corollary 1. Let assumption MMIV hold with V = S. Then
s < u ≤ umax
umax ≤ u < s
}
⇒ P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s) ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,S = u] ≤ 1
u = s ⇒ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,S = u] = P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s)
u < s ≤ umax
umax ≤ s < u
}
⇒ 0 ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,S = u] ≤ P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s)
else ⇒ 0 ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,S = u] ≤ 1,
and thus
s < umax ⇒ P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s) · P (s ≤ S ≤ umax|W ) (14)
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≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W ] ≤ P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s) · P (S ≤ s|W ) + P (S > s|W )
s = umax ⇒ P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s) · P (S = s|W ) (15)
≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W ] ≤ P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s)
s > umax ⇒ P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s) · P (umax ≤ S ≤ s|W ) (16)
≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W ] ≤ P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s) · P (S ≥ s|W ) + P (S < s|W ).
In the absence of other information, these bounds are sharp.
The bounds in Corollary 1 result from a split of S into two subsets with separation point
equal to the global maximum umax. If s and u both lie on one side of umax, then the MMTS
assumption is informative and yields bounds that are tighter than the logical unit range. If s
and u are not element of the same subset, then the MMTS assumption alone is not informative
regarding the counterfactual distribution.
3 Semi-Monotone Treatment Response
The preceding section explored assumptions in terms of an instrument that, when conditioned
on, restricts the shape of the potential outcome distribution. One might also think of imposing
assumptions on the response function Y (s) directly, either for each individual, or for the distri-
bution of outcomes in the population. Assumptions of the former type have been investigated
in Manski (1997), Manski and Pepper (2000, 2009), and Okumura and Usui (2007). Two
assumptions of the latter type, referred to as weak monotone treatment response (WMTR)
and maximum monotone treatment response (MMTR), will be investigated here:
Assumption (WMTR). Let S be an ordered set. Y (s) fulfills a weak stochastic order condition
if, for each y ∈ Y, t ∈ S, X ∈ X , and all s1, s2 ∈ S × S with s1 ≤ s2,
P [Y (s1) ≤ y|X,S = t] ≥ P [Y (s2) ≤ y|X,S = t]. (17)
Assumption (MMTR). Let S be an ordered set. Y (s) fulfills a weak stochastic order condition
with a maximum point if, for each y ∈ Y, t ∈ S, X ∈ X , and all s1, s2 ∈ S × S with
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s1 ≤ s2 ≤ smax = argmaxs∈S P [Y (s) ≤ y|X,S = t],
P [Y (s1) ≤ y|X,S = t] ≤ P [Y (s2) ≤ y|X,S = t], (18)
and for all s1, s2 ∈ S × S with smax ≤ s1 ≤ s2,
P [Y (s1) ≤ y|X,S = t] ≥ P [Y (s2) ≤ y|X,S = t]. (19)
Assumption WMTR states that the outcome distribution in state s1 weakly dominates the
outcome distribution in state s2 ≥ s1, irrespective of the realized state. WMTR holds, for
example, under the monotone treatment response assumption of Manski (1997) that restricts
individual responses by the condition: s2 ≥ s1 ⇒ Y (s2) ≥ Y (s1). Assumption WMTR is also
fulfilled if the Manski (1997) assumption does not hold for all members of the population, but
on average across the population. The weak inequality is assumed to hold conditional on X,
and thus still holds conditional on W , or unconditional on covariates.
Assumption MMTR asserts the existence of a state smax that stochastically dominates all
other states, i.e., P [Y (smax) ≤ y|X,S = t] ≥ P [Y (s) ≤ y|X,S = t) for all s 6= smax. The
distributions are assumed to be monotonically increasing in s to the left and monotonically
decreasing to the right of the maximum point. Hence, the MMTR assumption encompasses
the WMTR assumption as a special case if smax is at the lower boundary of S. It may also
reverse the sign of the weak inequality if the maximum point is at the upper boundary of S.
It is straightforward to replace MMTR by a minimum condition, so one may refer to it more
generally as a semi-monotone treatment response assumption.
Assumption WMTR places the following sharp bounds on the potential outcome distribu-
tion (see Manski 1997 for further details):
P (Y ≤ y|W,S ≥ s)P (S ≥ s|W ) ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W ] ≤ (20)
P (Y ≤ y|W,S ≤ s)P (S ≤ s|W ) + P (S > s|W ).
which follows from the law of total probability and the presumed monotonicity, such that
P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s) can be used as an informative lower bound on all P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,S = t)
with t > s, and as an informative upper bound on all P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,S = t) with t < s.
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Weak monotonicity combined with a global maximum point splits the support of S into
a lower level and an upper level set relative to smax. While the same type of bounds on the
counterfactual probabilities as under WMTR apply for the latter, arguments with a reversed
sign of the inequality can be applied for the former. Proposition 2 summarizes the bounds:
Proposition 2. Let assumption MMTR hold. Then
s < t ≤ smax
smax ≤ t < s
}
⇒ 0 ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,S = t] ≤ P (Y ≤ y|W,S = t)
s = t ⇒ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,S = t] = P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s)
t < s ≤ smax
smax ≤ s < t
}
⇒ P (Y ≤ y|W,S = t) ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,S = t] ≤ 1
else ⇒ 0 ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,S = t] ≤ 1,
and thus
s < smax ⇒ P (Y ≤ y|W,S ≤ s) · P (S ≤ s|W ) ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W ] ≤ (21)
P (Y ≤ y|W, s ≤ S ≤ smax) · P (s ≤ S ≤ smax|W )
+[1− P (s ≤ S ≤ smax|W )]
s = smax ⇒ P (Y ≤ y|W ) ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W ] ≤ (22)
P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s) · P (S = s|W ) + [1− P (S = s|W )]
s > smax ⇒ P (Y ≤ y|W,S ≥ s) · P (S ≥ s|W ) ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W ] ≤ (23)
P (Y ≤ y|W, smax ≤ S ≤ s) · P (smax ≤ S ≤ s|W )
+[1− P (smax ≤ S ≤ s|W )].
In the absence of other information, these bounds are sharp.
Note that assumptions MMTR and MMTS contribute differently to the identification of
P [Y (s) ≤ y|W ]. While the former explores stochastic dominance over potential states s in
Y (s), the latter explores stochastic dominance over realized states, i.e., conditional on S. In
each case, credible knowledge of the stochastic order, i.e., the sign of the weak inequalities,
and of the global maximum points is essential in the construction of bounds.
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4 Assumptions on Treatment Selection and Response
One might also think of combining the assumptions of Sections 2 and 3. A particularly in-
teresting case is obtained if the MMTS and the MMTR assumptions are imposed jointly. In
order to illustrate their identifying power, it is helpful to employ a matrix representation of
the counterfactual probabilities, as in the following example with four states:
P [Y (1) ≤ y|W,S = 1] ≤ P [Y (1) ≤ y|W,S = 2] ≤ P [Y (1) ≤ y|W,S = 3] ≥ P [Y (1) ≤ y|W,S = 4]
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
P [Y (2) ≤ y|W,S = 1] ≤ P [Y (2) ≤ y|W,S = 2] ≤ P [Y (2) ≤ y|W,S = 3] ≥ P [Y (2) ≤ y|W,S = 4]
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
P [Y (3) ≤ y|W,S = 1] ≤ P [Y (3) ≤ y|W,S = 2] ≤ P [Y (3) ≤ y|W,S = 3] ≥ P [Y (3) ≤ y|W,S = 4]
≥ ≥ ≥ ≥
P [Y (4) ≤ y|W,S = 1] ≤ P [Y (4) ≤ y|W,S = 2] ≤ P [Y (4) ≤ y|W,S = 3] ≥ P [Y (4) ≤ y|W,S = 4]
The main diagonal elements are identified from the observed data distribution, the off-
diagonal elements are not identified. The MMTS assumption places a sequence of inequalities
between the columns of the matrix, the MMTR assumption places inequalities between the
rows of the matrix. Suppose, for simplicity, that smax = umax = 3 such that the inequalities can
be placed as shown above. The matrix can be used to derive sharp lower and upper bounds on
P [Y (s) ≤ y||W,S = u] for all s 6= u. For example, P [Y (2) ≤ y|W,S = 1] can be bounded from
below by P (Y ≤ y|W,S = 1) and bounded from above by P (Y ≤ y|W,S = 2). Informative
bounds can be placed on all counterfactual distributions with s ≤ smax and u ≤ umax, or
s ≥ smax and u ≥ umax. For all other s, u combinations, the bounds zero and one apply.
The bounds on the potential outcome distributions P [Y (s) ≤ y|W ] in the special case of
MMTS and MMTR with smax = umax are summarized in the following corollary:
Corollary 2. Let assumption MMIV hold with V = S, and let assumption MMTR hold.
Suppose smax = umax. Then,
s < smax ⇒ P (Y ≤ y|W,S ≤ s) · P (S ≤ s|W ) + P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s) (24)
·P (s < S ≤ smax|W ) ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W ] ≤
P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s) · P (S < s|W ) + P (Y ≤ y|W, s ≤ S ≤ smax)
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·P (s ≤ S ≤ smax|W ) + P (S > smax|W ),
s = smax ⇒ P (Y ≤ y|W ) ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W ] ≤ P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s), (25)
s > smax ⇒ P (Y ≤ y|W,S ≥ s) · P (S ≥ s|W ) + P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s) (26)
·P (smax ≤ S < s|W ) ≤ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W ] ≤
P (S < smax|W ) + P (Y ≤ y|W, smax ≤ S ≤ s) · P (smax ≤ S ≤ s|W )
+P (Y ≤ y|W,S = s) · P (S > s|W )].
In the absence of other information, these bounds are sharp.
The key to Corollary 2 is again to split the support of S into a lower and an upper level
set relative to the global maximum point, and to derive the bounds on the counterfactual
probabilities for each of these sets. Note that the bounds of Corollary 2 are never wider but
often tighter than the bounds of Corollary 1 or the bounds of Proposition 2.
5 Illustrations
5.1 Simulated Data Example
Consider the following model for the selection and outcome processes:
S =
3∑
s=1
sI(τs−1 < ψ ≤ τs) (27)
Y (s) =
3∑
y=1
yI(κs,y−1 < ε ≤ κs,y), s = 1, 2, 3
where I(A) is the logical indicator function that returns one when A is true. The observed
data are the pair (Y, S) with Y = Y (S). The selection status and the potential outcomes
in each state are generated according to a threshold crossing mechanism where −∞ = τ0 <
τ1 < τ2 < τ3 = ∞, and −∞ = κs,0 < κs,1 < κs,2 < κs,3 = ∞. The selection model allows
for random thresholds with τ1 = ν1 and τ2 = τ1 + exp(ν2) to fulfill the order condition. The
parameters κs,y and ψ are constant but unknown.
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Model (27) does not impose a-priori restrictions on the joint distribution of (ν1, ν2, ε).
In particular, the correlations between the error terms of the selection process and the error
term of the outcome process are free to vary (except for common regularity conditions such
as a finite and positive definite covariance matrix). Moreover, the model allows for arbitrary
behavioral assumptions in the selection process since no a-priori assumptions are imposed on
the correlation between ν1 and ν2. The model does however impose the restriction that the
error terms in all states are generated by the same process. This assumption substantially
simplifies the illustration below, by allowing to focus on the influence of the main parameters
on the construction and properties of the bounds.
The model can be extended to allow for covariates W by making the thresholds in the
selection process and in the outcome processes functions of W . However, in line with the
notion of the paper, the model avoids exclusion restrictions (i.e, non-overlapping subsets of W
appear in κ and τ), such that accounting for covariates amounts to defining treatment effects
(and deriving bounds) for subpopulations described by W .
In order to illustrate the construction of bounds, the error terms (ν1, ν2, ε) are assumed
jointly normal with zero means and covariance matrix
Σ =


1 σ1,2 σ1,ε
σ1,2 1 σ2,ε
σ1,ε σ2,ε 1

 .
The following additional restrictions are imposed on the data-generating process: σ1,ε = α/2,
σ1,ε = −α/2, σ1,2 = 0. The thresholds in the outcome processes are specified as
κ1,1 = −β/2 κ2,1 = 0 κ3,1 = −β/5 (lower thresholds)
κ1,2 = .7 κ2,2 = .3 κ3,2 = .4 (upper thresholds)
The parameters α (scenario 1), β (scenario 2), and ψ (scenario 3) are varied in the simulation
study, one at a time between -1 and 1 with the other parameters fixed at one.
Each of these parameters makes a different contribution to the (partial) identification of
the potential outcome distribution. The parameter α does only affect the treatment selection
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assumption. For α positive, the assumption of an asymmetric correlation structure (positive
correlation for the lower selection threshold and negative correlation for the upper selection
threshold) generates a global maximum point in the MMTS sense at umax = 2. If α is
negative, then the maximum point turns into a global minimum point. If α equals zero, then
the potential outcome distribution does not vary conditional on different values of S, which is
equivalent to an IV assumption with the instrument equal to the treatment variable.
The parameter β only affects the treatment response assumption because it changes the
lower outcome thresholds. If β is positive, then P [Y (s) ≤ 1|S] is maximal at smax = 2,
which turns into a minimum point if β is negative. If β equals zero, then P [Y (s) ≤ 1|S]
does not differ over states. The upper outcome thresholds are chosen such that the order
condition is fulfilled, and the relative magnitude over states generates a global minimum point
in P [Y (s) ≤ 2|S] at smin = 2. Finally, ψ does not affect the treatment selection and treatment
response assumptions, but it affects the severity of the partial identification result, i.e., the
width of the bounds, by varying the proportion of observations in each state.
Figures 1 to 3 display the potential outcome distribution if α is varied from -1 to 1 (and all
other parameters are fixed as described above). In each figure, the diagrams on the left show
the probability that the potential outcome takes value 1 in state 1 (top), in state 2 (middle),
and in state 3 (bottom). The right diagrams show the probability that the potential outcome
takes values less or equal 2 in the three states. Figure 1 shows the bounds on the potential
outcome distribution if only the MMTS assumption is imposed, Figure 2 if only the MMTR
assumption is imposed, and Figure 3 if both assumptions are imposed jointly.
— Insert Figures 1 to 3 about here —
Consider Figure 1 and the top left diagram, i.e., the probability that the potential outcome
in state 1 takes value 1. This probability can be written as
P [Y (1) ≤ 1] = P (Y ≤ 1|S = 1)P (S = 1) + P [Y (1) ≤ 1|S = 2]P (S = 2)
+P [Y (1) ≤ 1|S = 3]P (S = 3)
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where all terms but P [Y (1) ≤ 1|S = 2] and P [Y (1) ≤ 1|S = 3] are point identified from
the observed data distribution P (Y, S). If α is negative, then the MMTS assumption implies
a global minimum point at 2 = argminu∈S P [Y (s) ≤ 1|S = u] such that P (Y ≤ 1|S = 1)
can be used as an upper bound on P [Y (1) ≤ 1|S = 2] instead of one with the lower bound
zero unchanged. P [Y (1) ≤ 1|S = 3] is bounded by zero and one since it lies to the right of
the minimum point with the identified probability lying on the left and thus no informative
conclusions can be drawn from the MMTS assumption. If α is positive, then the minimum
point is replaced by a maximum point such that P (Y ≤ 1|S = 1) can be used as a lower bound
on P [Y (1) ≤ 1|S = 2] instead of zero with the no-assumptions upper bound one unchanged.
If α = 0, then the potential outcome distribution does not vary conditional on different S.
and thus P [Y (1) ≤ 1] is point identified by the observed P (Y ≤ 1|S = 1). Similar arguments
apply to the cumulative probabilities of outcome 2 and the other states.
Now consider the top left diagram of Figure 2. The assumptions imposed on the data-
generating process imply a global maximum point in the MMTR sense at 2 = argmaxs∈S
P [Y (s) ≤ 1|S = u]. Thus, irrespective of α, P (Y ≤ 2|S = 2) can be used as an upper bound
for P [Y (1) ≤ 1|S = 2] instead of one with the no-assumptions lower bound zero unchanged, but
no informative conclusions can be drawn from the MMTR assumption on P [Y (1) ≤ 1|S = 3].
By the assumptions on the upper thresholds of the outcome process, the global maximum point
turns into a global minimum point for outcomes less or equal two, and thus P (Y ≤ 2|S = 2)
can be used as an informative lower bound on P [Y (1) ≤ 2|S = 2] with the no-assumption
upper bound one unchanged. Again, similar arguments apply to the other states.
Figure 3 combines the bounds of Figures 1 and 2. If the MMTS andMMTR assumptions are
imposed jointly, then the larger of the lower bounds and the smaller of the upper bounds under
each assumption provides a binding constraint on the possible range of the potential outcome
distribution. Since the two assumptions make different contributions on identification, the
overlap of both assumptions may provide a substantial improvement over the bounds obtained
under either assumption alone. This explains, on the one hand, the observed kinks in the
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upper and lower bounds, and, on the other hand, the small width in some cases (such as for
the lower part of the distribution in state 2 and α > 0, and the upper part for α < 0.
Figures 4 to 6 summarize the results for β altered from -1 to 1 (scenario 2). Since β does
not affect the MMTS assumption, and α is fixed at 1, the conclusions drawn from the MMTS
assumption are analogous to the outer right part of the bounds in Figure 1. Furthermore, since
β only affects the lower threshold parameters, a change in the bounds over the range of β is only
observed in the left panel of Figure 5. If β is negative, then 2 = argmins∈S P [Y (s) ≤ 1|S = u]
such that, for example, P (Y ≤ 1|S = 2) can be used as a lower bound on P [Y (1) ≤ 1|S = 2]
instead of zero, with the no-assumptions upper bound one unchanged. If β is positive, then
the minimum point turns into a maximum point such that P (Y ≤ 1|S = 2) can be used as an
upper bound on P [Y (1) ≤ 1|S = 2] instead of one, with the no-assumptions lower bound zero
unchanged. This explains the upward shift in the lower bound for β < 0 and the downward
shift in the upper bound for β > 0. If β = 0, the potential outcome distribution is point
identified because the thresholds do not vary over treatment states.
— Insert Figures 4 to 6 about here —
Scenario 3 considers the variation in ψ from -1 to 1. Since ψ only affects the distribution
of states, but does not affect MMTS and MMTR (which are determined by α = β = 1), this
scenario illustrates the trade-off in the collection of data on states. The smaller ψ, the more
observations are in state 1; the higher ψ, the more observations are in state 3. Thus, for low
values of ψ, the bounds on the potential outcome distribution in state 1 is tightest, but the
bounds on the distribution in state 3 are wide, and vice versa for high values of ψ. An (inverse)
u-shaped effect of ψ on the bounds can be observed for the distribution in state 2. Again,
if both assumptions are imposed jointly, then MMTS and MMTR may yield a substantial
improvement over the no-assumptions bounds.
— Insert Figures 7 to 9 about here —
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5.2 The Effect of Education on Smoking
As an empirical example, I consider the effect of schooling (S) on health behavior (Y ), the latter
measured as the number of cigarette packs smoked per day. The relationship between education
and smoking has been thoroughly studied before (e.g., Grossman 1972, Farrell and Fuchs 1982,
Kenkel 1991, Rosenzweig 1995, Currie and Moretti 2003, Kenkel et al. 2006, de Walque 2007,
Grimard and Parent 2007, Gilman et al. 2008, and Tenn et al. 2008). The evidence suggests
that the more educated people have a smaller likelihood to smoke, a higher likelihood to quit,
and smoke less on average. The literature is not conclusive, however, regarding the magnitude
of the impact, ranging from negligibly small to negative and significant. The studies differ
in the identification strategies and data used to estimate the causal effect, if present, though
none of them has explicitly accounted for schooling effects on the entire smoking distribution.
The framework above is well-suited to address this problem.
The analysis is based on the Smoking Supplement of the 1979 US National Health Inter-
view Survey which contains information on the respondent’s socioeconomic characteristics and
smoking behavior. Details on the data can be found in Mullahy (1985). The population has
been restricted to employed white men aged between 35 and 60, which gives a total of 1,981
observations. Table 1 provides estimates of the smoking distribution conditional on schooling.
The results indicate a global minimum in P (Y ≤ y|S) between 9 and 11 years of schooling.
Thus, the joint (modified) assumptions MMTS with 2 = argminu∈S P [Y (s) ≤ y|S = u] and
MMTR with 2 = argmins∈S P [Y (s) ≤ y|S = u] are not rejected by the empirical evidence
alone, and I will maintain these assumptions in what follows.
— Insert Table 1 about here —
Figure 10 displays the bounds on the potential smoking distributions for each of the stated
schooling levels. The no-assumptions bounds provide the widest consensus possible, imposing
bounds zero and one on each counterfactual quantity (left bars). The bounds obtained under
the MMTS assumption (middle left bars) make use of the monotonicity condition to the left
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and to the right of the global minimum point. Similar arguments apply for the bounds under
the MMTR assumption (middle right bars). The matrix representation provides an intuitive
way to determine which bounds apply:
P [Y |S = 1] ≥ P [Y (1)|S = 2] ≤ P [Y (1)|S = 3] ≤ P [Y (1)|S = 4] ≤ P [Y (1)|S = 5]
≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥
P [Y (2)|S = 1] ≥ P [Y |S = 2] ≤ P [Y (2)|S = 3] ≤ P [Y (2)|S = 4] ≤ P [Y (2)|S = 5]
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
P [Y (3)|S = 1] ≥ P [Y (3)|S = 2] ≤ P [Y |S = 3] ≤ P [Y (3)|S = 4] ≤ P [Y (3)|S = 5]
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
P [Y (4)|S = 1] ≥ P [Y (4)|S = 2] ≤ P [Y (4)|S = 3] ≤ P [Y |S = 4] ≤ P [Y (4)|S = 5]
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
P [Y (5)|S = 1] ≥ P [Y (5)|S = 2] ≤ P [Y (5)|S = 3] ≤ P [Y (5)|S = 4] ≤ P [Y |S = 5]
where the weak inequalities between columns follow from the MMTS assumption, and the weak
inequalities between rows follow from the MMTR assumption. Imposing both assumptions
jointly yields an intersection of the bounds on each counterfactual distribution, and thus the
overall bounds on the potential outcome distribution (right bars) are never wider than the
intersection of the bounds under each assumption alone. Moreover, the bounds can be tighter
than the intersection of bounds since MMTS and MMTR both can make contributions to more
informative lower and more informative upper bounds.
— Insert Figure 10 about here —
The bounds in Figure 10 demonstrate that the MMTS and the MMTR assumptions jointly
can have substantial identifying power compared to the no-assumptions bounds. For example,
the possible range of the probability of non-smoking if everybody in the population were
to receive 12 years of schooling shrinks from [0.201; 0.857] to [0.518; 0.674]. However, the
bounds are still too wide to identify the stochastic order of the distributions since they share
common elements over all schooling levels. Thus, the analysis presented here cannot reject
the hypothesis that the statistical association between schooling and smoking is only caused
by unobserved confounding factors.
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6 Conclusion
Constraints on functional form provide a powerful yet not overly restrictive strategy to analyze
counterfactual distributions. Two sets of assumptions are analyzed here. First, the maximum
(or minimum) monotone instrumental variables assumption, which imposes constraints on the
variation of the potential outcome distribution conditional on the instrument. And second, the
maximum (or minimum) monotone treatment response assumption, which restricts the shape
of the outcome distribution over potential states. As a general result, point identification can
only be achieved in special cases. However, if both types of assumptions are imposed jointly,
then they may significantly improve over the no-assumptions bounds.
The bounding strategy poses two limits on the analysis of causal effects. First, it requires
sufficiently large and rich data since the outcome distribution in each state is estimated sepa-
rately. Furthermore, without additional assumptions it is generally not possible to extrapolate
to outcomes not actually observed. Second, while in some cases it is possible to test the joint
set of assumptions, and thus to evaluate their plausibility, the imposed structure may still be
too weak to allow drawing informative conclusions regarding the stochastic order, even par-
tially. It might therefore be desirable to combine the assumptions of this paper with additional
restrictions, such as concavity or convexity, some sort of exclusion restriction, or additional
information regarding the outcome mechanism.
A crucial issue in the construction of bounds is credible knowledge of the extremum points,
which may not always exist, and it would be helpful to develop a data driven criterion to
identify global minima or maxima. Further research is also needed regarding inference. First,
the potential finite sample bias in the analogue estimates needs to be appropriately corrected
(see Kreider and Pepper 2007, and Manski and Pepper 2009, for related results). Second,
the uncertainty in the sign of the inequalities and the location of the extremum points in
the MMIV/MMTS and the MMTR assumptions must be accounted for in order to derive
confidence intervals with a pre-defined coverage probability.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Smoking distribution conditional on schooling
Schooling categories (years)
≤ 8 9-11 12 13-15 ≥ 16
P(S) 0.090 0.136 0.343 0.172 0.259
[178] [270] [681] [340] [512]
P (cigs = 0|S) 0.523 0.485 0.584 0.627 0.760
P (cigs ≤ 1/2 pack|S) 0.618 0.548 0.648 0.688 0.799
P (cigs ≤ 1 pack|S) 0.781 0.752 0.824 0.835 0.883
P (cigs ≤ 1 1/2 packs|S) 0.860 0.856 0.888 0.915 0.920
Source: Smoking Supplement of the 1979 US National Health Interview
Survey, own calculations. Notes: The estimates are based on a random
sample of 1,981 observations on employed white men aged 35-60. The
numbers of observations used to estimate each cumulative distribution are
reported in square brackets. cigs denotes the number of cigarette packs
smoked per day, S denotes the years of schooling in categories as shown.
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Figure 1: Bounds under MMTS only – Scenario 1
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Notes: Thick black lines denote the true potential outcome distribution P [Y (s) ≤ y] as indicated on the vertical
axes, small grey triangles (circles) denote the no-assumptions upper (lower) bounds, large hollow triangles
(circles) denote the upper (lower) bounds as derived in Corollary 1 under the MMTS assumption only.
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Figure 2: Bounds under MMTR only – Scenario 1
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axes, small grey triangles (circles) denote the no-assumptions upper (lower) bounds, large hollow triangles
(circles) denote the upper (lower) bounds as derived in Proposition 3 under the MMTR assumption only.
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Figure 3: Bounds under MMTS/MMTR assumptions – Scenario 1
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Notes: Thick black lines denote the true potential outcome distribution P [Y (s) ≤ y] as indicated on the vertical
axes, small grey triangles (circles) denote the no-assumptions upper (lower) bounds, large hollow triangles
(circles) denote the upper (lower) bounds under the MMTS/MMTR assumptions.
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Figure 4: Bounds under MMTS only – Scenario 2
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Notes: Thick black lines denote the true potential outcome distribution P [Y (s) ≤ y] as indicated on the vertical
axes, small grey triangles (circles) denote the no-assumptions upper (lower) bounds, large hollow triangles
(circles) denote the upper (lower) bounds as derived in Corollary 1 under the MMTS assumption only.
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Figure 5: Bounds under MMTR only – Scenario 2
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Notes: Thick black lines denote the true potential outcome distribution P [Y (s) ≤ y] as indicated on the vertical
axes, small grey triangles (circles) denote the no-assumptions upper (lower) bounds, large hollow triangles
(circles) denote the upper (lower) bounds as derived in Proposition 3 under the MMTR assumption only.
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Figure 6: Bounds under MMTS/MMTR assumptions – Scenario 2
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Notes: Thick black lines denote the true potential outcome distribution P [Y (s) ≤ y] as indicated on the vertical
axes, small grey triangles (circles) denote the no-assumptions upper (lower) bounds, large hollow triangles
(circles) denote the upper (lower) bounds under the MMTS/MMTR assumptions.
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Figure 7: Bounds under MMTS only – Scenario 3
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Notes: Thick black lines denote the true potential outcome distribution P [Y (s) ≤ y] as indicated on the vertical
axes, small grey triangles (circles) denote the no-assumptions upper (lower) bounds, large hollow triangles
(circles) denote the upper (lower) bounds as derived in Corollary 1 under the MMTS assumption only.
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Figure 8: Bounds under MMTR only – Scenario 3
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Notes: Thick black lines denote the true potential outcome distribution P [Y (s) ≤ y] as indicated on the vertical
axes, small grey triangles (circles) denote the no-assumptions upper (lower) bounds, large hollow triangles
(circles) denote the upper (lower) bounds as derived in Proposition 3 under the MMTR assumption only.
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Figure 9: Bounds under MMTS/MMTR assumptions – Scenario 3
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axes, small grey triangles (circles) denote the no-assumptions upper (lower) bounds, large hollow triangles
(circles) denote the upper (lower) bounds under the MMTS/MMTR assumptions.
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Figure 10: Bounds on the potential smoking distribution by schooling level
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Source: Smoking Supplement of the 1979 US National Health Interview Survey, own calculations. Notes: The
estimates are based on a random sample of 1,981 observations on employed white men aged 35-60. Left bars
are obtained using the empirical evidence alone. The MMTS assumption asserts that 2 = arg minu∈S P [Y (s) ≤
y|S = u] (middle left bars), the MMTR assumption asserts that 2 = arg mins∈S P [Y (s) ≤ y|S = u] (middle
right bars). The right bars indicate the bounds obtained under the joint set of assumptions MMTS and MMTR.
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